Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Since the 1960s, the nature and the future of the European Union have been defined in legal terms. Yet, we are still in need of an explanation as to how this entanglement between law and EU polity-building emerged and how it was maintained over time. While most of the literature offers a disembodied account of European legal integration, Brokering Europe reveals the multifaceted roles Euro-lawyers have played in EU polity, notably beyond the litigation arena. In particular, the book points at select transnational groups of multipositioned legal entrepreneurs which have been in a situation to elevate the role of law in all sorts of EU venues. In doing so, it draws from a new set of intellectual resources (field theory) and empirical strategies only very recently mobilized for the study of the EU. Grounded on an extensive historical investigation, Brokering Europe provides a revised narrative of the 'constitutionalization of Europe'.

Public law. Constitutional law --- European law --- Law --- Law - European Union countries

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The Federalist Papers comprise eighty-five essays written to persuade New Yorkers to ratify the Constitution of the United States in 1787-8. Written by key players in the American Revolution, they made a case for a new, united nation. They are the most important work of political thought to have come out of America. - ;'A nation without a national government is an awful spectacle.'. In the winter of 1787-8 a series of eighty-five essays appeared in the New York press; the purpose of the essays was to persuade the citizens of New York State to ratify the Constitution of the United States. The t

Public law. Constitutional law --- United States --- Constitutional history --- Constitutional law --- United States of America

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Can the Supreme Court be free of politics? Do we want it to be? Normative constitutional theory has long concerned itself with the legitimate scope and limits of judicial review. Too often, theorists seek to resolve that issue by eliminating politics from constitutional decision making. In contrast, Terri Peretti argues for an openly political role for the Supreme Court. Peretti asserts that politically motivated constitutional decision making is not only inevitable, it is legitimate and desirable as well. When Supreme Court justices decide in accordance with their ideological values, or consider the likely political reaction to the Court's decisions, a number of benefits result. The Court's performance of political representation and consensus-building functions is enhanced, and the effectiveness of political checks on the Court is increased. Thus, political motive in constitutional decision making does not lead to judicial tyranny, as many claim, but goes far to prevent it. Using pluralist theory, Peretti further argues that a political Court possesses instrumental value in American democracy. As one of many diverse and redundant political institutions, the Court enhances both system stability and the quality of policymaking, particularly regarding the breadth of interests represented.

Constitutional law --- Political questions and judicial power --- Judicial review --- Public law. Constitutional law --- United States --- United States of America

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Public law. Constitutional law --- Political Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Public Finance --- Budget --- Finance, Public --- Law and legislation --- Germany (West) --- Cultural policy. --- constitutional law --- fundamental rights --- democracy

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The future of the U.S. Supreme Court hangs in the balance like never before. Will conservatives or liberals succeed in remaking the court in their own image? In A Constitution of Many Minds, acclaimed law scholar Cass Sunstein proposes a bold new way of interpreting the Constitution, one that respects the Constitution's text and history but also refuses to view the document as frozen in time. Exploring hot-button issues ranging from presidential power to same-sex relations to gun rights, Sunstein shows how the meaning of the Constitution is reestablished in every generation as new social commitments and ideas compel us to reassess our fundamental beliefs. He focuses on three approaches to the Constitution--traditionalism, which grounds the document's meaning in long-standing social practices, not necessarily in the views of the founding generation; populism, which insists that judges should respect contemporary public opinion; and cosmopolitanism, which looks at how foreign courts address constitutional questions, and which suggests that the meaning of the Constitution turns on what other nations do. Sunstein demonstrates that in all three contexts a "many minds" argument is at work--put simply, better decisions result when many points of view are considered. He makes sense of the intense debates surrounding these approaches, revealing their strengths and weaknesses, and sketches the contexts in which each provides a legitimate basis for interpreting the Constitution today. This book illuminates the underpinnings of constitutionalism itself, and shows that ours is indeed a Constitution, not of any particular generation, but of many minds.

Public law. Constitutional law --- Legal theory and methods. Philosophy of law --- United States --- Constitutional law --- Interpretation and construction --- Constitutional law - United States --- Etats-Unis --- United States of America